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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law
and Judicial Subservience in Kenya
Makau Mutua*
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutionalism and the rule of law are the central features of any political
democracy that respects human rights. An independent judiciary, the
essential guardian of the rule of law, is the linchpin of the scheme of checks
and balances through which the separation of powers is assured.' Other-
wise, there is no other guarantee that the executive-the "government"-
will respect the rule of law and act within established legal norms,
* Professor Makau Mutua is Professor of Law and Director of the Human Rights Center at the
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University of Dar-es-Salaam, and at Harvard Law School, where he obtained a Doctor of
Juridical Science in 1987.
Professor Mutua was Co-Chair of the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Society of
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Rights," "Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: the Limits of Rights Discourse," "The
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1. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 711-12 (1996).
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processes, and institutions. The constitution is thus not merely hortatory but
the fundamental and supreme law of the land, the real and living document
that guides, defines, and permits all actions by the state. No individual or
official of the state is above the law or can act in defiance of constitutional
prescriptions. This is what separates democratic states from undemocratic
ones. It is the difference between tyranny and freedom.
Since its creation by the British in 1895, the Kenyan state has undergone
two significant transformations, both marked by illiberalism and massive
human rights violations. Little need be said of the colonial state that was
specifically organized for the purposes of political repression to facilitate
economic exploitation. In 1963, Kenya formally became an independent,
sovereign state, ending decades of direct British colonial rule.2 Kenya's
postindependence history, however, has been marked by sharp contradic-
tions between the state and civil society in spite of its image, cultivated in
the West during the Cold War, that the east African state was the beacon of
hope for Africa. Not even the reintroduction of multipartyism in 1991 nor
the two contested presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 and
1997 have brought relief from state-directed human rights violations, an
abomination that has become the trademark of the Nairobi government.
Kenya's 1963 independence Constitution provided for a multiparty
democracy, a freely elected bicameral Parliament, and guaranteed judicial
independence.3 In spite of the liberal Constitution, the post-colonial state
was autocratic at its inception because it wholly inherited the laws, culture,
and practices of the colonial state. In 1964, Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi,
President of Kenya since 1978, voluntarily dissolved the opposition party,
the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). He then joined the ruling
Kenya African National Union (KANU), headed by the nation's first African
head of state, the late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. The "merger made Kenya a de
facto one party state and paved the way for a despotic executive." 4
In the absence of any legalized and official opposition and despite the
Constitution's allowance of parliamentary democracy, President Kenyatta
quickly created a highly centralized, authoritarian republic, reminiscent of
the colonial state. Although Oginga Odinga, then Vice President, broke
ranks to form the opposition Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU), President
Kenyatta outlawed it in 1969 and detained all its principal leaders.5 Upon
2. See AFRICA WATCH, KENYA: TAKING LIBERTIES 5 (1991).
3. See H. W. 0. OKOTH-OCENDO, LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN KENYA: AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 27-35
(Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1988).
4. See Makau wa Mutua, Human Rights and State Despotism in Kenya: Institutional
Problems, 41 AFR. TODAY 50 (1994); See also JENNIFER WIDNER, THE RISE OF A PARTY STATE IN
KENYA: FROM HARAMBEE! TO NYAYO! (1992).
5. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, DEMOCRATISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN KENYA 11
(1997) [hereinafter DEMOCRATISATION].
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President Kenyatta's death, Vice President Moi succeeded to the presidency
in 1978. Insecure at first, President Moi quickly took a number of important
measures to consolidate personal rule. The net effect of these measures was
to heighten repression and dramatically curtail all freedoms. Mismanage-
ment, official corruption, and graft skyrocketed. The national economy has
since spiraled into a precipitous decline.
6
In June 1982, after popular calls for an open political system, President
Moi pushed a constitutional amendment through the single party Parliament
making Kenya a de jure one-party state.7 Several months later, an aborted
coup by a section of the Kenyan Air Force spurred President Moi to crush all
dissent and concentrate all power into his hands. From then on, President
Moi worked to perfect the repressive state crafted by President Kenyatta.
Through the government and KANU, he exercised extensive and deep
control over civic groups, trade unions, the press, the Parliament, and most
critically, the judiciary. Political murder, detention without trial, arbitrary
arrests and detentions, false and politically motivated charges of opponents,
both real and imagined, became the business of the state. State and KANU
officials committed crimes with impunity. Laws and constitutional amend-
ments that abrogated due process protections and the independence of the
judiciary were passed without parliamentary debate or resistance.8
Even after the authorization of open political competition in 1991,
President Moi and KANU have continued to resist the installation of
democracy. The government has used all its resources to frustrate a genuine
transition to democracy. Since 1992, the state periodically has engineered
and orchestrated inter-ethnic violence, particularly against communities
that support opposition political parties. The police and security forces
constantly invoke colonial era legislation to restrict the activities of the press
and civic and human rights groups. The judiciary, which lacks indepen-
dence and is viewed by Kenyans as subservient to the executive, continues
to be a captive instrument of repression. 9
This article frankly and critically discusses and analyzes the state of the
Kenyan judiciary and the problems that beset it in acting as the custodian of
the rule of law. The article argues that the judiciary has been subservient to
6. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000: EVENTS OF 1999, 48-50 (2000).
7. See CONST. OF KENYA , § 2(a) amend., act No. 7 (1982). In 1982, President Moi forced a
constitutional amendment, making Kenya officially a one-party state. It provided that:
"There shall be in Kenya only one political party, the African National Union."
8. See JAMES GATHII, THE DREAM OF JUDICIAL SECURITY OF TENURE AND THE REALITY OF EXECUTIVE
INVOLVEMENT IN KENYA'S JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 (1994) [a Kenya Human Rights Commission
publication].
9. See DREW DAYS III ET AL., JUSTICE ENJOINED: THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY IN KENYA 4 (1992) [a
publication of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights]; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH supra note 6, at 48.
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the executive. The judiciary has shown no ability or inclination to uphold
the rule of law against the express or perceived whims and interests of the
executive and individual senior government officials, their business associ-
ates, and cronies. The government has acted swiftly and expeditiously to
discipline or dismiss individual judges and magistrates who occasionally
have failed to carry out its wishes. The judiciary has ruled consistently in
favor of the KANU elite and its supporters in cases involving their corrupt
practices and political interests. In fact, the judiciary has been only too
eager to protect the political monopoly of the KANU. State officials and
business associates of leading public servants have sought the protection of
the legal system and the judiciary for their illegal actions as official
corruption has become the norm. An aggrieved party cannot expect the rule
of law to be upheld by a Kenyan court if the offender is a public official or
is connected to the KANU elite. An umbrella of protection covers the illegal
actions of the KANU ruling elite and its surrogates. This article concludes
that nothing short of radical surgery of the norms, institutions, and personnel
that comprise the legal and political structures of the Kenyan state can
restore the judiciary's role as the guarantor of legality and the guardian of
human rights.
II. LAW AND POLITICS
Law and politics have always been intertwined since the birth of the Kenyan
republic in 1964. Although the Kenyan Constitution guarantees fundamen-
tal rights on its face, the government has substantially eroded and weakened
many of the safeguards since independence. The Bill of Rights10 gives
individuals basic rights but then restricts them with qualifying limitations,
otherwise known as clawback clauses." Derogations from the Bill of Rights
are also constitutionally permitted during an emergency. 12 The first major
blow to the rule of law came in 1966 when the young republic passed the
Preservation of Public Security Act (PPSA), 13 in essence reenacting colonial
10. See CONST. OF KENYA ch. V, §§ 70-83.
11. For instance, the Constitution of Kenya protects individuals against arbitrary search and
entry but then qualifies such protection, in part, in the following language:
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with
or in contravention with this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision (a) that
is reasonably required in the interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality,
public health, town and country planning, the development and utilization of mineral resources,
or the development and utilization of any other property in such a manner as to promote the
public benefit.
CONST. OF KENYA ch. 5, §§ 76 (1-2).
12. See CONsT. OF KENYA ch. V, § 83.
13. See CAP. 57, Laws of Kenya.
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detention laws. Under the PPSA, the government detained scores of its
outspoken critics, and in the process stifled calls for democratic change and
an open society. Although on its face constitutional-and even formally a
democracy since 1992-the Kenyan state is in reality highly repressive and
authoritarian, trapped in the culture of the one-party state.
In a telling admission of lawlessness, Attorney General Amos Wako
stated in 1991 that "a characteristic of the rule of law is that no man, save
for the president, is above the law."' 4 As noted by the respected Geneva-
based International Commission of Jurists, the "Executive is still an overact-
ing and predatory institution shadowing and preying upon the other two
constitutionally coequal branches of government-the Legislature and the
Judiciary."" s Indeed, the last decade of multipartyism has witnessed the
increased fragmentation of Kenya and the escalation of the divide and rule
tactics of the Moi government. State despotism has sapped the energy of
virtually all sectors of society-the Parliament, the political opposition,
trade unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the press, and
opposition political parties-through intimidation, official corruption, arbi-
trary arrests, and the persecution of political opponents. Unfortunately, the
judiciary has been only too eager to be used by the government as an
instrument of repression. As a result, the country now dances on the
precipice, in all respects ready to join its neighbors as a dysfunctional or
failed state.
III. THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The judiciary is supposed to be the guarantor of any legal system. The
Kenyan legal system is composed of the judiciary, law enforcement
agencies, the Office of the Attorney General, and the private bar organized
under the auspices of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK). The Constitution of
Kenya creates the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the highest courts in
the land.16 The High Court, however, exercises original jurisdiction on all
matters and is therefore the most important court in the country. In
particular, the High Court has the final authority over matters of constitu-
tional interpretation. It also exercises appellate jurisdiction over all deci-
sions of the Magistrates Courts, where the bulk of litigation takes place in
Kenya.'7 The Court of Appeal may review decisions of the High Court where
14. The Rule of Law Will Prevail, WEEKLY REV., 12 July 1991, at 26 [reprint of the Attorney
General's first speech to Parliament].
15. DEMOCRATISATION, supra note 5, at 19.
16. See CONSI. OF KENYA ch. IV, pt. 1, §§ 60(1), 64(1).
17. See id.
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the latter has original jurisdiction.18 Except for High Court rulings on
constitutional questions, the Court of Appeal may also review High Court
opinions on matters of law. The judiciary is supposed to be separate and
independent from the executive. Abstractly, this structure appears rational
and sensible. The devil, however, is in the specifics and the history of the
manipulation by the executive of the judiciary and the legal system to
concentrate power in the presidency and the ruling party.
The passage of the detention law in 1966 started a broad but steady
attack on the rule of law and integrity of the judiciary and the legal system.
When the government converted Kenya from a de facto one party system to
a de jure one party state in 1982, even the private bar was so steeped in the
culture of subservience that it did not openly challenge this fundamental
shift and rejection of democracy. However, relations between the state and
the private bar started to deteriorate when in 1986, in another dramatic
departure from the rule of the law, President Moi arrogated to himself
through law the power to dismiss both the Attorney General and the Auditor
General at will.19 The removal of security of tenure, and therefore indepen-
dence, for these two key government officers signaled a disregard of the
importance of tenure for officials that uphold the rule of law and make sure
that the government acted within legal bounds. It further opened the door to
impunity and made possible imminent attacks on judicial independence.
As is well known, during the colonial era, judges served at the pleasure
of the Crown.20 However, the independence Constitution seemed to change
the nature of the relationship between the executive and the judiciary. It
stated that "[a] Judge of the High Court may be removed from office only for
inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity
of body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehavior, and shall not
be so removed except in accordance with this section."21
In fact, the independence Constitution provided for a complex process
of the removal of judges, deliberately insulating them from executive power.
Removal of a judge was only possible after a presidentially appointed
tribunal had considered the matter and made recommendations to the
president.22 However, the force of habit and the culture of subservience to
officialdom was too difficult to overcome, despite the protections provided
for in the independence Constitution. The regimes of President Kenyatta and
18. See CONST. OF KENYA ch. IV, pt. I, § 64(1).
19. See DREW DAYS III ET AL., JUSTICE ENJOINED: THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY IN KENYA 4 (1992) [a
publication of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights].
20. See YASH GHAI & J.W.P.B. McAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA: 1865-1970,
173 (1970).
21. CONST. OF KENYA ch. IV, pt. I, § 62(3).
22. See CONST. OF KENYA ch. IV, pt. I, § 62 (4-7).
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President Moi, his successor, treated the courts just like any other agency
within the executive. Finally in 1988, President Moi prevailed over the
rubber stamp Parliament to pass a constitutional amendment with far-
reaching implications for judicial independence and respect for human
rights in Kenya. In a stunning act of docility, the KANU Parliament removed
the security of tenure for judges. It also extended from twenty-four hours to
fourteen days the period during which suspects in capital cases could be
held without charge.23 However, in 1990 under intense pressure both
domestically and internationally, President Moi buckled and instructed the
Parliament to restore judicial security of tenure. 24 Although the constitu-
tional amendment technically restored almost all of the judicial tenure
provisions of the independence Constitution, the damage had already been
done.25 Once tenure is abolished there is no guarantee that it will not
happen again. The chill introduced by such blatant disregard for a basic
constitutional principle by the executive underlined the subordinate status
of the courts in Kenya.
Legal systems cannot function effectively to guarantee basic rights if the
private bar is not free of state coercion. Until 1986 when the Moi
government carried out widespread arrests and committed egregious human
rights violations against outspoken critics ostensibly in pursuit of Mwakenya,
a small underground movement, the private bar had been solidly allied with
the KANU government. 26 Only two lawyers had previously been targets of
the state. Willy Mutunga, a law lecturer, was detained in 1982 for allegedly
teaching "subversion." John Khaminwa met a similar fate in 1984 for rep-
resenting a political detainee.27 However, such confrontations between
private attorneys and the state were the exception, as the profession had
generally chosen to support the state. That peaceful coexistence ended in
1986 with the arrest and detention of two lawyers, Wanyiri Kihoro and
Mirugi Kariuki, for alleged connections with Mwakenya.
28
In February 1987, the government detained Gibson Kamau Kuria, a law
lecturer and a prominent Nairobi lawyer, for filing a habeas corpus
application on behalf of Mirugi Kariuki.29 The arrest of the three lawyers,
and particularly that of Kuria, a widely respected moderate, drew intense
23. See CONsT. OF KENYA amend, act no. 4 (1988).
24. See CONST. OF KENYA amend. act no. 1 (1990).
25. See DAYS ET. AL., supra note 19, at 21.
26. See DAVID GILLES & MAKAU MUTUA, A LONG ROAD TO UHURU: HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION IN KENYA 22 (1993) [a publication of the Montreal-based International Centre
for Human Rights and Democratic Development].
27. See id.
28. See AFRICA WATCH, supra note 2, at 128.
29. See DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 42-43.
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domestic and international scrutiny. The LSK, seeing the attack as destruc-
tive to the profession, joined the battle to press for the release of the three
lawyers. It also became more outspoken of human rights abuses by the
government. The government retaliated by promulgating regulations to
require that lawyers obtain annual practice licenses.30 The government then
tried but failed to affiliate the LSK to KANU. It also unsuccessfully tried to
manipulate the LSK's election in favor of pro-government candidates.
Finally, Paul Muite, a leader of the pro-democracy movement, was elected
to the helm of the LSK in 1991, beating state-directed efforts to stop him. At
his acceptance speech, Muite, the widely respected opposition politician,
pointed the finger directly at the state. The government, he categorically
said:
must continue to be told by us lawyers that the greatest threat to public security
is not us lawyers, when we speak out . . . [Tihe greatest danger to public
security is the Kenya government itself. It can remove that danger by adhering
to the constitution, both in theory and practice. By faithfully subscribing to the
Rule of Law, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights, "threat to
public security" will become a thing of the past.31
Since then, successive chairs of the LSK-particularly Willy Mutunga
and Gibson Kamau Kuria-have turned it into a leading voice for demo-
cratic reform, the rule of law, and the independence and integrity of the
judiciary and the legal system. 32 However, as Human Rights Watch, the
respected New York based human rights group noted in its 2000 annual
report, the government has resisted these calls, and instead further height-
ened its attacks on the legal system.
The link between corruption and eroded respect for human rights was most
evident in the judiciary, the provincial administrations, and the police. The
government had always used the judiciary for political ends. In September
[1999], the sudden death of Chief Justice Zachaeus Chesoni, resulted in the
appointment of the public prosecutor, Bernard Chunga, as chief justice. The
appointment of Chunga, known for his zealous prosecution of government
critics, caused an uproar in the legal community and appeared to signal a
serious step backwards for judicial independence.3
30. See DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 49. (Lawyers would have been required to obtain
licenses under the Trade Licensing Act) CAP. 497, Laws of Kenya.
31. See DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 51.
32. See, e.g., Parliament Condemned for Downsizing Corruption List, AFRICA NEWS, 20 July
2000, available on Lexis, News Library; Kenya Stalls on Political Reform But Aid Pours
In, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 10 Mar. 1995, at 17.
33. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 48.
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IV. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
There is a two-tiered system for the appointment of judges and magistrates
in Kenya. Neither mechanism seems to secure judicial independence and at
least both raise serious questions about the government commitment to the
rule of law. In both instances, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) plays an
important role. The JSC is composed of the Chief Justice, the Attorney
General, two judges appointed by the president, and the Chairman of the
Public Service Commission4.3 In any case, all JSC members are presidential
appointees, either directly or indirectly, because he appoints the Attorney
General, the Chief Justice, and the Chairman of the Public Service
Commission. Thus the president personally composes, without any constitu-
tionally required oversight or mandatory input from any other source, the
most important judicial commission in the country.
Presidential control over the judiciary extends to the appointment of the
judges of the High Court. As provided for in the Constitution, the "puisne
judges," judges of the High Court, excepting the Chief Justice shall be
appointed by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission.3" However, even if the JSC was to think
independently, its advice does not legally bind the president. The reality is
that the Office of the President together with the Chief Justice-who is
appointed for his affinity to President Moi and KANU-select the judges.
The selection of judges to the High Court therefore does not involve the
solicitation of the views of any outside or professional body such as the LSK.
Even a body appointed by the late Chief Justice Chesoni, a close ally of
President Moi, recently recommended reform of the JSC to democratize it
and disentangle it from domination by the presidency. It recommended that:
The Judicial Service Commission should be completely overhauled to provide
for the representation of the Law Society of Kenya and the Kenya Magistrates
and Judges Association. The representatives of the Court of Appeal and the High
Court on the Judicial Service Commission should be elected by the judges of
those courts and not just selected as is the practice at the moment and should
not serve for more than one term of four (4) years at a time. The Commission
should also have its own secretariat separate from the Registrar of the High
Court.36
The Kwach Report,37 named for the chair of the committee that
produced it, addresses a wide range of problems that have crippled the
34. See CONST. OF KENYA ch. IV, pt. III, § 68(1).
35. See CONST. OF KENYA ch. IV, pt. I, § 61(2).
36. REPUBLIC OF KENYA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (1998) [hereinafter KWACH REPORT].
37. See id.
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judiciary. These include terms and conditions of service, questions of
corruption and discipline within the judiciary, and structural, logistical, and
organizational problems. Although some steps are apparently being taken to
look into some of the minor recommendations by the report, it is doubtful
that the nature of the JSC, which would require a constitutional amendment
to reform, will be addressed any time soon, if ever.3 8
The domination of the judiciary by the executive cascades downward
to the Magistrates Court, where most cases are heard in Kenya. The Judicial
Service Commission, the presidential instrument, exercises complete con-
trol over the appointment of magistrates. As pointed out by James Gathii,
"neither the Kenyan Constitution nor any Kenyan law guarantees judicial
officers manning subordinate [magistrates] courts any form of security of
tenure."39 Kenya's bifurcated judiciary permits the state to treat magistrates
courts as an extension of its police and security apparatus, as most of the
magistrates are appointed through patronage, and are expected to carry out
the wishes of the executive if they intend to keep their jobs.4" Under the
circumstances, it is impossible to see how any magistrate, no matter how
courageous, can assert independence in matters in which the state has a
direct interest.
V. REMOVAL AND SECURITY OF TENURE
Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a
mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office.41 The
government views the security of tenure for judges as a great inconve-
nience. It removed such formal, constitutional security in 1988 and only
restored it in 1990 after the suspension of military assistance by the United
States.42 Under the 1990 constitutional amendment restoring judicial tenure
and security, a judge can only be removed for physical or mental inability to
38. See ELIZABETH WANAMA MULl, CONSULTANT'S REPORT TO THE LEGAL SECTOR REFORM COORDINATING
COMMITTEE 12 (1999) (reporting that the judiciary is taking steps to implement aspects of
the Kwach Report recommendations). See also Tops MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, THE KENYAN
JUDICIARY SERVICE: DELIVERY SURVEY (1999).
39. GATHII, supra note 8, at 11.
40. See DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 18.
41. United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, princ. 12, 7th
U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 (1985) at 59. The document further provides that:
Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent
review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the
legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.
Id. at princ. 20.
42. See DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
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execute the functions of the office or for misbehavior.43 It is the President,
however, who has the power to remove a judge upon the recommendation
of a five-member tribunal that he appoints.44 The mechanism for removal
begins when the Chief Justice suggests to the President that such a course
ought to be pursued. The President then appoints a tribunal to consider the
matter and make recommendations. The President may also appoint a panel
to consider the removal of the Chief Justice. As correctly pointed out by a
group of American lawyers, these removal procedures leave a lot to be
desired.
The current security-of-tenure protections also pose problems. The Executive
can easily circumvent the procedures for independent judicial removal pro-
ceedings. Judges may be removed only by the recommendation of a five-
member tribunal, but the President chooses those members. Thus the President
has great discretion in determining the make-up of this tribunal. This degree of
Presidential discretion and the composition of the independent tribunal raises
questions about the protections provided for the security of judicial tenure.4"
However, the Constitution is not clear on the legal character of the
recommendations made by the tribunal to the President. It seems that such
recommendations are not legally binding on the President. Such tenuous
tenure protections are heightened in Kenya where judges, once they are
removed from the bench, are prohibited from practicing law before its
courts. This increases the pressure on judges to do the state's bidding
because employment as practicing lawyers is forbidden upon removal or
retirement from the judiciary.
Magistrates, of course, face an even harsher fate. Their professional
lives are governed by the JSC regulations and the Magistrates Courts Act,
which are neither guided by, nor based on, the principle of judicial
independence.46 Magistrates, who are treated by the JSC as civil service
employees in need of strict supervision and as lacking in the capacity for
independence, have never been permitted to entertain the notion of tenure.
The JSC has the power to "hire, discipline, promote and dismiss magistrates
on various grounds specified in the regulations." 47 Unlike judges, magis-
trates do not even get a presidentially-dominated removal process.
43. See CONST. OF KENYA amend, act no. 1 (1990).
44. The Constitution of Kenya reads:
A judge of the High Court shall be removed from office by the President if the question of his
removal has been referred to a tribunal appointed under subsection (5) and the tribunal has
recommended to the President that the judge ought to be removed from office for inability as
aforesaid or for misbehavior.
CONST. OF KENYA ch. IV, pt. I, § 62(4).
45. DAYs ET AL., supra note 19, at 21.
46. See Magistrates Courts Act, CAP. 10, Laws of Kenya.
47. GATH11, supra note 8, at 11.
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In Kenya, magistrates courts have been at the forefront of the suppres-
sion of basic freedoms and human rights since most political offenses are
prosecuted before them. These offenses were created by Draconian colonial-
era laws that the Moi government still employs to stifle dissent and resist
democratic reforms. Among the most notorious are the Chief's Authority
Act, which restricts the rights of assembly, movement, and speech.48 Others
include the Public Order Act,49 which gives local officials the right to deny
the right to assembly; the Penal Code, 0 which creates the offense of
sedition; and the PPSA, under which one can be detained without trial."' In
fact, lower courts, which are burdened by heavy caseloads and poor
infrastructure, are under tremendous pressure to keep citizens "in line" or
risk the wrath of both the district, provincial, and central executive
authorities. Quite often, the most compliant magistrates are raised to the
High Court.
Financial and political corruption are so rampant within the society in
general, and the magistrates court in particular, that the Kwach Report
declared in its "Judicial Rectitude" section that "corruption has taken centre
stage." 2 Among other matters, the committee recommended frequent
transfers of magistrates, better pay and working conditions, the hearing of all
matters in open court, and the introduction of a code of ethics as remedial
measures.5 3 Surprisingly, the committee did not address the root causes of
corruption within the judiciary. A serious examination of the problem would
have unpacked the reality of corruption that the executive practices as
official policy, and of which the magistracy partakes as standard routine. It
is futile to expect a captive magistracy that acts as an instructed agency of
the executive not to engage in moral, professional, and financial corruption.
Transfers and better working conditions cannot cure such a cancer. Only an
overhaul of the legal and substantive relationships between the judiciary
and the executive can start to restore sanity to the system.
VI. SECURITY OF TENURE AND CONTRACT JUDGES
Early in the life of the republic, President Kenyatta devised the notion of
hiring non-Kenyans on contract to serve on the High Court and Court of
48. See Chief's Authority Act, CAP. 128, Laws of Kenya.
49. See Public Order Act, CAP. 56, Laws of Kenya.
50. See Penal Code, §§ 56 & 57, CAP. 63, Laws of Kenya.
51. See MAINA KIAI, INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT FREEDOM: THE LEGITIMIZATION OF REPRESSIVE LAWS AND
PRACTICES IN KENYA 3 (1994) [a Kenya Human Rights Commission Publication] for an
elaboration of these repressive laws.
52. REPUBLIC OF KENYA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 9 (1998).
53. See id. at 11.
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Appeal. This was a sure way of keeping the judiciary loyal to him. s4
"Contract judges," predominantly British citizens, were literally hired guns
who needed no encouragement to do the government's bidding. It is
important to note at the outset that the Constitution makes no provision for
contract judges, and as such they are covered by all the provisions and
protections that relate to the judiciary in matters of appointment, tenure,
and removal. Thus, they cannot be constitutionally removed by adhering to
the relevant constitutional provisions. However, the KANU government, in
clear violation of the Constitution, has treated contract, expatriate judges as
a special species hired by it to carry out its express or perceived wishes or
face disciplinary action, including summary removal, without regard to the
Constitution. Kiai described their circumstances well. "Their contracts were
renewable at the government's option, and since most of these judges could
never attain such positions and comfort in their home countries, they were
jittery about attracting the wrath of the government.""
There is widespread agreement among observers of the judiciary that
the institution of the contract judge, which is often financially supported by
the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) at the request of
the Kenyan government, is corrosive and undermines judicial indepen-
dence. Supporters even resorted to the racist argument that expatriate judges
were incorruptible because they did not have any African ethnic loyalties.
An African government was ready to impugn the dignity of its own citizens
by suggesting that Africans are more corruptible than whites in order to
justify hiring judges it would control.5 6 A former contract judge explained
the economics of the institution in the following language:
[Tihey [contract judges] are there because they have a nice job, which they
cannot get in England. This is not the old-style colonial legal service where you
had career judges going from one place to another-these are not judges of
considerable experience coming from another territory. They are-with excep-
tions-judges who are hanging on to the job and therefore susceptible to local
pressures.-7
Some contract judges have gone too far in proving their loyalty to the
government. One, former Chief Justice Alan Robin Hancox, went so far as to
urge all lawyers and judges "to be Loyal to Government and to the Head of
54. See KIAI, supra note 51, at 18. (During President Kenyatta's fifteen-year reign, only one
native black African Kenyan, Kitili Mwendwa, served as Chief Justice, and only for a
scant two-year period from 1969-1971. In 1978, upon President Kenyatta's death,
twelve out of nineteen judges on the High Court and Court of Appeal were foreigners on
contract.)
55. Id.
56. See DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 23-25.
57. See Lucy Hannan, Bias and Judicial Outrage, 141 NEw L.J. 900 (28 June 1991), available
on LEXIS, Secondary Legal: Legal News File.
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State."5 8 In general, contract expatriate judges have ruled in favor of the
government and KANU in matters where their actions were challenged as
undemocratic, unconstitutional, or illegal. Contract judges who have
exhibited any measure of independence have either been summarily
terminated or punished by the Chief Justice through some administrative
device, such as a transfer to a remote location or removal from hearing
particular matters.
The history of executive interference with judicial independence, and
in particular the security of tenure, has deep roots in Kenyan history. Cases
abound to prove these insidious intrusions into the judicial sphere. For
instance, in 1969 following the banning of the opposition KPU and the
arrest and detention of its key leaders, Justice G. Farrel and Acting Chief
Justice Dalton reduced the sentence of Bildad Kaggia, the KPU vice
president from twelve to six months.5 9 In what looked like a strange
coincidence, President Kenyatta appointed Kitili Mwendwa Chief Justice on
the day of the ruling, and a few days later Justice Farrel "retired" from the
bench. 60 Barely two years later, Mwendwa himself was forced to resign after
a failed coup attempt.6 1 President Kenyatta was reportedly unhappy with
Mwendwa's business interests. 62 In September 1985, Mwendwa was killed
in a suspicious automobile accident.63
A stunning example of executive interference with the judiciary in-
volved the fate of Justice Derek Schofield, an expatriate contract judge. In
1987, Justice Schofield was hearing a habeas corpus application for
Mbaraka Karanja who had been shot dead and buried by the police without
notification to his family. Justice Schofield then held the Director of
Criminal Investigation in contempt for his failure to locate and exhume
Karanja's body. According to Justice Schofield, Chief Justice Miller sum-
moned him and told him to disqualify himself from the case on the orders of
President Moi. 64 Justice Schofield asked Chief Justice Miller to tell President
Moi that it was improper to interfere with the judiciary.6 Chief Justice Miller
then removed the case from Justice Schofield, and later revealed that he had
58. See M.M. Kioga, Chief Justice's Pronouncements: (Are they Law or Politics?), 23 NAIROBI
L. MON. 7 (Apr,/May 1990).
59. See Kaggia v. Republic, E. AFR. L. REP. 451 (1969).
60. See GATHII, supra note 8, at 10.
61. See id. at 10; see also, COLN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-
COLONIALISM (1975).
62. See When it Comes to Judges, Most of them Have Gone Quietly, WEEKLY REV., 5 Aug.
1988, at 9.
63. See Death in a Car Crash of Kenya's First African Chief Justice, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, 1 Oct. 1985, available on LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
64. See Why I left Kenya-Schofield, 41 NAIROBI L. MON. 49 (Feb./Mar. 1992) [Speech to the
Cayman Bar Association]; see also DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 23.
65. See id.
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taken the action after the receipt of "secret documents" from the Office of
the Attorney General. 66 Rather than comply with these illegal actions,
Justice Schofield resigned and left the country. He later summed up the state
of the Kenyan judiciary thus: "the Chief Justice and some of the judges saw
it as their duty to assist the President [Moi] and the government [KANU
government] ... Thus the superior courts tended to support the government
and particularly the President [Moi] grew to expect compliance with his
wishes."
67
In 1988, the following year, Chief Justice Miller dismissed Justice
Patrick O'Connor in clear violation of the Constitution. Upon receipt of a
termination letter from the Chief Justice for refusal to accept a transfer from
Nairobi to Meru, a rural agricultural district, Justice O'Connor questioned
the constitutional authority of the Chief Justice to fire him. 68 The Constitu-
tion provides for a tribunal to consider the matter and make recommenda-
tions on removal to the President. Reemphasizing the extraordinary degree
of executive control over the judiciary, the Head of the Civil Service and the
Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, Joseph Letting, stated:
I wish to inform the public and all interested parties that in relieving Mr. Justice
O'Connor of his duties, the Chief Justice, who is Chairman of the Judicial
Service Commission, acted within the powers vested in him by the Constitution
of this country. . . .Under the Constitution of Kenya, the power to exercise
disciplinary control over judges or to remove them from office are vested with
the Judicial Service Commission .. .which can delegate its powers to any of its
members including the Chief Justice.69
It was soon after O'Connor's removal that President Moi rammed
through Parliament-in a bare three hours-the infamous 1988 constitu-
tional amendment deleting the judicial tenure provisions of the indepen-
dence Constitution.70 Even the usually pro-government Weekly Review
decried the measure and chastised legislators for being "resigned" and
"more jovial than serious" in passing the bill desired by the executive,
although it "touched on some of the most fundamental tenets of the
country's constitution, involving the independence of the judiciary from
political control."71
66. See Gitobu Imanyara, The Office of the Chief Justice and Chief Justice Hancox's
Challenge, NAIROBI L. MON., Sept./Oct. 1989, at 18; see also DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at
75, note 43.
67. Schofield, supra note 64, at 50.
68. See GATH11, supra note 8, at 13.
69. Id.
70. See Parliament Amends the Constitution with Surprising Alacrity, WEEKLY REV., 5 Aug.
1988, at 3.
71. Id.
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The formal restoration of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the
security of tenure of judges has not in fact protected judicial tenure in
Kenya. In 1994, the government revoked the contract of Justice Edward
Torgbor, a Ghanaian contract judge. 2 The previous year, the government
declined to renew the expired contract of Justice J.A. Couldrey7 3 Justices
Torgbor and Couldrey were both terminated after ruling that an election
petition against President Moi by an opposition party leader was validly
filed.14 Again, it is instructive that the Head of the Civil Service and the
Secretary to the Cabinet wrote to Justice Torgbor ahead of the expiry of his
contract advising him that the government would not be renewing it.7"
Needless to say, the constitutional safeguards for the removal of judges were
blatantly abrogated in cases of Justices Torgbor and Couldrey.
Virtually no manifestation of independence by judges has gone unpun-
ished. For instance, in 1992, Justice Thomas Mbaluto ruled against the
KANU dominated Electoral Commission for reducing the period required
for nomination of candidates and the conduct of campaigns in advance of
the 1992 general elections.16 Amos Wako, the Attorney General, had used a
formal procedure to amend the National Assembly and Presidential Elec-
tions Act77 in order to shorten the time for nomination of candidates,
knowing fully well that only the opposition political parties would be
disadvantaged by the change. Justice Mbaluto disallowed the amendment
and ruled that the Attorney General's action could "only be construed to
have been a misuse if not an abuse of the powers conferred upon his
office."78 He added that in his "view that was clearly illegal." 79 As he
delivered his ruling, Justice Mbaluto was twice interrupted by telephone
calls from Phillip Mbithi, the Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the
Cabinet, ostensibly seeking to alter the judgment.80 Soon thereafter, Justice
Mbaluto was transferred from Nairobi to Mombasa, and then to Kisii, a rural
72. See Gitau Warigi, Kenya's Memory of Expatriate Chief Justices, AFRICA NEWS, 10 Dec.
1997, available on LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
73. See id.
74. See Kenneth Stanley Njindo Matiba v. Daniel Toroitich arap Moi and Others, Election
Petition No. 27 of 1993 (1 July 1993).
75. See Charles Wachira, Kenya Politics: A Judiciary Under Siege, INTER PRESS SERV., 16 July
1994, available on LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. See also DAILY NATION, 2 June
1994, at 32; STANDARD, 2 June 1994, at 5.
76. See Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Gitobu Imanyara and Hassan Kadir v. The Electoral
Commission, reported in NAIROBI L. MON. Oct./Nov. 1992, at 46 [hereinafter Imanyara &
Hassan].
77. See National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, CAP. 7, Laws of Kenya.
78. Imanyara & Hassan, supra note 76, at 44.
79. Id. at 44.
80. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEMORIAL CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, KENYA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMANDS
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTENSIFY 9 (1997) [hereinafter KENYA AT THE CROSSROADS].
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farming district in the west of the country.8' Justice Frank Shields, another
contract judge who consistently exhibited independence from executive
wishes, also failed to have his contract renewed in 1994.82
Disrespect for the rule of law by the executive extends to other fora
beyond the formal judiciary, such as the Judicial Commission of Inquiry
investigating the murder in 1990 of Dr. Robert Ouko, then Minister for
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 83 Independent investigators
from the Scotland Yard testified before the Commission that Nicholas
Biwott, cabinet minister and the closest ally of President Moi, had, together
with Hezekiah Oyugi, chief of internal security, masterminded Ouko's
murder because he knew of and was opposed to their notorious corrup-
tion.84 As corruption and other incriminating evidence against Biwott, then
the second most powerful person in Kenya, and other senior ministers
quickly accumulated, the finger started to point at President Moi. On 26
November 1991, President Moi abruptly disbanded the Commission before
it could conclude the proceedings.8" As noted by Gathii, on the same day
"the three judges [on the Commission] publicly complained about the
threats, intimidation and tapping of their hotel rooms by the police."8 6
There is no indication that the Kenyan judiciary will recapture its
independence any time soon. President Moi's 1997 appointment of Chesoni
to the post of Chief Justice signaled that the executive was determined to
keep the bench compliant.87 A pro-government judge, Zachaeus Chesoni
was the former chair of the Electoral Commission, the body that oversaw the
1997 presidential and parliamentary elections. Mired in personal legal
problems, Chesoni was widely viewed as having made the Electoral
Commission a docile instrument for KANU and the government.88 The Law
Society of Kenya and its chair, Nzamba Kitonga, opposed his elevation,
fearing that he would not be independent.89
Bernard Chunga, who succeeded Chesoni in 1999, is also very close to
KANU and President Moi. He became only the third native black African
Kenyan chief justice since independence. In 1998, President Moi appointed
him lead counsel to the Commission on Ethnic Clashes, which investigated
81. See GATHII, supra note 8, at 17.
82. See id. at 19.
83. See Makau Mutua, A Break with the Past, AFR. REP., Jan./Feb. 1992, at 21.
84. See id. at 22.
85. See id.
86. GATHII, supra note 8, at 22.
87. As the newly appointed Chief Justice, Chesoni was only the second native black African
Kenyan to head the judiciary.
88. See Kenya's New C Has Rough Start to Term of Office, AFR. NEWS, 10 Dec. 1997,
available on LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
89. See id.
Vol. 23
Justice under Siege
"ethnic violence."9" Since 1991, thousands of Kenyans have been killed and
more than 300,000 displaced in government sponsored political violence
targeted at members of communities perceived to be supporters of opposi-
tion political parties.9 1 When Chunga took over as lead counsel, he denied
access to witnesses who wanted to testify about the active involvement of
government officials in instigating, fostering, and allowing the violence.92
While Chief Justice Chunga has admitted that corruption is a major
problem, he has not addressed the critical issue of judicial independence
from the executive. 3 No one expects him to depart from the practices of his
predecessors.
VII. THE JUDICIARY: AN AGENCY OF THE EXECUTIVE
The Kenyan courts have often evaded their constitutionally mandated
responsibility to protect individual rights. The courts have stood aside as the
Kenyan government has used the Preservation of the Public Security Act (the
Kenyan detention law) as an instrument of political repression. The courts
have largely refused to review allegations of torture or other mistreatment.
"In the face of judicial inaction, blatant political prosecutions for treason
and sedition have proceeded without serious examination of the constitu-
tional values at risk."94
Those were the conclusions of a human rights report in 1992.11 In the
eight years since, not much has changed. The courts continue-as they
have throughout Kenya's history-to act as an agency of KANU, the ruling
party and the state. Frankly, it is not just the executive that is to blame for the
dependence of the judiciary. Judges themselves have bent over backwards
to accommodate the wishes of the executive for financial and political
rewards. Few in the judiciary have resisted executive intrusions and many
seem to think like civil servants and ruling party stalwarts. Patronage and
cronyism are so endemic that most of those appointed to the judiciary and
the magistracy are either mediocre or flatly incompetent.
90. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 49.
91. See id. See also JOEL A. SOLOMON, FAILING THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION I
MULTIPARTY KENYA-1993 15-21 (1994) [a publication of the Robert F. Kennedy
Memorial Center for Human Rights]; INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, FACING THE PLURALIST
CHALLENGE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN KENYA'S DECEMBER 1992 MULTI-PARTY
ELECTIONS 14 (1992); AFRICA WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE: STATE-SPONSORED ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KENYA
(1993).
92. See id.
93. See Chief Justice Gives Pledge Over Graft, APR. NEWS, 5 Mar. 2000, available on LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
94. DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 9.
95. See id. at 9.
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There have been many particularly shocking instances of judicial
timidity and complicity with the executive over the last decade. In 1988, for
example, Justice Akiwumi refused to entertain the claim of a KANU member
who alleged that the party's nomination process had denied him certain
constitutional rights.96 Surprisingly, Justice Akiwumi decided that the High
Court lacked jurisdiction to look into the constitutionality of KANU's actions
with regard to the electoral rights of aspirants, even though the High Court
has unlimited original jurisdiction on all matters, civil and criminal. In
effect, the High Court held that KANU was free to determine for itself-
without judicial review-the limitations that it could place on the political
process.
Another important instance involved government and judicial collusion
to stop the LSK from leading the crusade for the restoration of multipartyism,
thus ending KANU's political monopoly as the only sole legal political
party. After Paul Muite was elected chair of the LSK, he called on the
government to legalize the political opposition. Following the speech, four
members of the LSK, reportedly acting at the behest of the Attorney General,
successfully asked the High Court to restrain Muite and other LSK Council
members from "making any political statements, conducting business of the
LSK in any manner political, making any statements which might cause
political disaffection, or permitting Mr. Muite to preside over or participate
in any LSK Council meetings."97
Justice Norbury Dugdale, a contract judge, granted the application
against Muite and the members of the LSK Council. Justice J.A. Mango later
upheld the ruling and noted that calls by the LSK for the government to
allow the registration of opposition political parties other than KANU
"amounts to inciting the public to defy the law and creates contempt for the
lawmakers." 98 The High Court further noted that "it is definitely not within
their [LSK Council] scope to advise the public their version is the right one
as opposed to that of the government" and that such statements amounted
"to confusing the public." 99 The cowardice of the High Court in responding
to a despotic executive was chilling. It said that failure to restrain the
defendants from their "confrontational attitude against the government"
96. See James Kefa Wagara and Rumba Kinuthia v. John Anguka and Ngaruro Gitahi, High
Court of Kenya, Civil Case No. 724 of 1988. See Githu Muigai, The Judiciary and the
Search for a Philosophy of the Law: the Case of Constitutional Adjudication, in LAW AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN KENYA 110-12 (Kivutha Kibwana ed., 1992) [a publication
of the International Commission of Jurists-Kenya Section].
97. See DAYS ET AL., supra note 19, at 52.
98. Aaron Gitonga Ringera & 3 Others v. Paul K. Muite & 10 Others, Civil Suit No. 1330 of
1991 (30 Apr. 1991).
99. Id. at 12.
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would lead it to flex its muscles and ban the LSK. 10° It added, "God forbid,
but it is a real and live possibility, given the circumstances." 10 An
application by the LSK to the Court of Appeal seeking a stay of execution
was rejected.10 2 In November 1991, the order was mooted when the
government was forced to lift the prohibition on political parties.
Executive interference and its dictation to the judiciary and the
magistracy are commonplace. It has been known for a long time that the
Chief Justice, for example, issues "circulars" to judges instructing them on
how to rule in particularly sensitive matters.103 In 1993, when President Moi
directed magistrates not to grant bail to suspects charged with the illegal
possession of firearms, the Chief Justice issued a circular instructing
magistrates to comply. 104 To underscore the point, the police stormed into a
court in Molo and "without warning, notice or courtesy to the magistrate"
took an accused from the dock because they thought the magistrate was in
violation of the circular.0 s The suspect was later tried before Nakuru Chief
Magistrate William Tuiyot, a KANU loyalist.106
The government has reacted offensively in the rare occasions when
judges and magistrates have expressed their desire for independence from
the executive. In 1996, for example, magistrates at a judicial seminar in
Embu complained about executive interference and called for reforms to
protect them from retaliatory attacks by the presidency." 7 Similar sentiments
were expressed at a meeting of the Kenya Magistrates and Judges Associa-
tion in March 1997.108 To stem these assertions of independence, the
Attorney General and the Chief Justice have stopped judges and magistrates
from attending meetings with colleagues in other countries. In January
1996, the Chief Justice barred judges from attending an East African judicial
conference in Arusha, Tanzania.109 Shockingly, the Attorney General and the
Chief Justice stopped judges from attending the annual meeting of the East
African Law Society held in April 1997 in Mbarara, Uganda.110 Even the
cautious and pro-establishment International Bar Association lamented the
state of the Kenyan judiciary in this remarkable statement:
100. Id. at 17.
101. Id.
102. See GATHII, supra note 8, at 21.
103. See KENYA AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 80, at 9.
104. See id. at 10. See also DEMOCRATISATION, supra note 5, at 58-59 for the full text of another
circular issued by the Chief Justice in 1996, instructing magistrates to deny bail to
particular offenders, the law and the Constitution notwithstanding. It asked the Attorney
General to instruct public prosecutors accordingly.
105. See KENYA AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 80, at 10.
106. See id.
107. See E. AFR., 3 June 1996.
108. See Judges Condemn State Interference, SUNDAY NATION, 9 Mar. 1997.
109. See KENYA AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 80, at 11.
110. See DAILY NATION, 5 Apr. 1997.
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In a country where a Chief Justice directs the judiciary to comply with
statements made in a political speech by the President, one can hardly expect
lay people to accept that judges and magistrates ignore the wishes of the
President as to the outcome of cases serving before them. In short, whatever
judicial independence there may be in Kenya, there certainly, with few
exceptions, does not seem to be a proper degree of independence of the
judiciary from the main executive arm."'
VIII. THE COURTS AND THE GOLDENBERG SCANDAL
The corruption case known popularly as the Goldenberg Scandal has
shown the complete inability of Kenyan courts to effectively and fairly
adjudicate or try any matter in which senior officials of the government are
in jeopardy. The Goldenberg Scandal, the longest running case of massive
high level corruption in Kenyan history, was exposed in 1993.112 It involved
a fraudulent scheme in which the government was defrauded of hundreds of
millions, if not billions, of dollars in public funds. Seven years later, those
culpable have not been punished. 3
The facts of the scandal are stunning. Kamleshi Pattni, a businessman,
reportedly devised a scheme in which his company, Goldenberg Interna-
tional Ltd., purported to have exported gold and diamonds worth hundreds
of millions of dollars. 4 Kenya is not a large exporter of either gold or
diamonds. Pattni then presented fictitious, fabricated export compensation
claims for payment by the Central Bank of Kenya."' World Duty Free Ltd.
was indicated in Pattni's documentation as the consignee of the exports.' 1 6
Nasir Ali, the owner of World Duty Free Ltd., has categorically denied these
allegations and offered his own testimony in which he linked President Moi
to the scandal. 7 According to most observers, credible evidence suggests
that President Moi and his senior aides were involved in the sordid affair.1 8
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was so upset by the level of official
graft and the Goldenberg Scandal that it suspended funding to Kenya in
111. See KENYA AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 80, at 10.
112. See Catherine Gacheru, Goldenberg: It Goes to the Top, DAILY NATION, 5 OCT. 2000,
available on LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
113. See id.
114. See Six Days Later, Kenya Deports Ali, AFRICA NEWS, 3 Aug, 1999, available on LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See M. Warsama, Justice System Put to the Test as MPs Sue Ali Lawyer, AFRICA NEWS, 17
Aug. 1999, available on LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
118. See, e.g., Joel D. Barkan, Leakey Saved Elephants: Now the Public Purse?, CHRISTIAN So.
NEws MONITOR, I 1 Aug. 1999, at 9.
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1997.19 The Kenyan government placed Ali's duty-free shops on receiver-
ship and deported him from the country.120 Domestic remedies, if they exist,
are unavailable in this case because the state has manipulated the legal
system and employed both extra-judicial and political measures to block
any resolution.
The government of Kenya has thwarted every attempt to investigate and
prosecute those suspected of involvement in the Goldenberg Scandal.
Although acting under constitutionally granted authority, the Attorney
General's use of the power of nolle prosequi to stop prosecutions in the
Goldenberg matter looks like a protection racket for high-ranking offi-
cials.12 ' Clearly, the power to discontinue a prosecution should not be used
to conceal or prevent the punishment of a crime by a public official or to
thwart the rule of law. But the Attorney General appears to have invoked
this power when he discontinued two suits on the Goldenberg matter for
precisely these reasons. In the first, Raila Odinga, an opposition politician,
had filed suit against Vice President George Saitoti and six other senior
officials for conspiracy to defraud the government in the scandal. In the
other, the Attorney General stopped an effort by the LSK to privately
prosecute senior government officials implicated in the scandal.' It was
only after a parliamentary committee investigation and the insistence of the
foreign donors that the Attorney General initiated a half-hearted prosecu-
tion, apparently to blunt domestic and international pressures. 123
The deportation of Ali and the obstruction by the KANU government
spell doom for any meaningful resolution to the scandal. In any case, it
underscores the inability of the Kenyan legal system-and its judiciary in
particular-to uphold the rule of law, particularly in this case of historic
corruption by high governments officials. The use of the Office of Attorney
General, the police, and security apparatus to cripple the judiciary portends
a bleak future for the state and the country.
119. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 50; Razia Khan, Kenya's Reform May Appease
International Monetary Fund, BRIDGE NEWS, 10 Feb. 2000, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File.
120. See Six Days Later, supra note 114.
121. See Const. of Kenya ch. II, pt. Ill, § 26(3)(c). (The Constitution of Kenya permits the
Attorney General to "discontinue at any stage before judgement is delivered any such
criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or another person or
authority.")
122. See KENYA AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 80, at 6.
123. See id.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate the subservience of the
Kenyan legal system, and in particular its judiciary, to President Moi, the
ruling party KANU, and the executive in general. Since independence in
1963, the presidency has abrogated, through both legal and illegal means,
the constitutional coequality and separation of powers of the three branches
of the state. Not even the facade of judicial independence has been
maintained. President Kenyatta, and more blatantly his successor, President
Moi, made the judiciary into an instructed agency of the Office of the
President. Successive chief justices have served as the personal envoys of
President Moi in making sure that executive wishes were executed by both
the superior and subordinate courts without deviation. In the rare instances
where individual judges or magistrates have demonstrated even the slightest
evidence of independence, the executive has acted swiftly. Such errant
judicial officers have either been terminated, punished administratively or
professionally ruined. President Moi has permitted no margin for individual-
ity within the judiciary.
Today, Kenya is technically a multi-party state, in which opposition
parties occupy a significant portion of the legislative pie. Yet President Moi
and the KANU government have refused to permit democratic reform of the
country." 4 Steeped in the culture of the one-party state, President Moi has
transformed virtually all state apparatuses from the legislature to the
judiciary and the police and security services into instruments of personal
rule. Aided by draconian colonial-era laws, President Moi has stifled and
violently suppressed most civil, political and expressive rights, including
those of speech, assembly, and due process.'2 5 Opposition political figures,
independent businessmen, the press, and principled members of the bar,
among others, risk financial and professional ruin-if not worse-for their
perceived opposition to President Moi and the KANU brass. Regrettably, the
corrupt Kenyan judiciary, the one possible venue for protecting human
rights and punishing their violation, has willingly become a compliant
instrument of repression.
124. See WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITION POLITICS
IN KENYA 1992-1997 (1999) (describing a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the
contest for democratic reforms by civil society organizations and the intransigence of
the Kenya government).
125. See ALAMIN MAZRUI, KAYAS OF DEPRIVATION, KAYAS OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE, ETHNICITY, AND THE STATE IN
COASTAL KENYA (1997) [a Kenya Human Rights Commission publication]; MUTUMA RUTEERE,
DYING TO BE FREE: THE STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS IN MWEA (2000) [a Kenya Human Rights
Commission publication]; MUTUMA RUTEERE, MISSION TO REPRESS: TORTURE, ILLEGAL DETENTION,
AND EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS BY THE KENYAN POLICE (1998) [a Kenya Human Rights Commission
publication]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE: COMPOUNDED BY THE DENIAL OF MEDICAL CARE
(1995) (depicting catalogues of gross human rights violations by the Kenya government).
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